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研讨会

Debt Structure under Limited Commitment

来源:湖南大学经济与管理研究中心  日期:2017-03-30 人气:

   10:00-11:30 am, Mar. 31st, 2017 (Friday).

   点:Shuishang Teaching Building, Room 211


主  题: Debt Structure under Limited Commitment


主讲人: Prof. Hongda Zhong

         Assistant Professor of London School of Economics (LSE)

       

  

We provide a model of the term structure of corporate debt. The optimal debt contract balances the need to provide sufficient termination threat to make repayments incentive compatible (favoring early repayments) with the desire to avoid costly early liquidation (favoring late repayments). This simple trade-o_ endogenously determines (i) the number of repayment dates, (ii) their timing, and (iii) promised repayment amounts. Firms with stable risky cash flows and large outside financing needs make debt payments earlier and more often, effectively a sequence of short-term debt contracts. For firms with cash-flow growth or significant risk-free cash-flow component, on the other hand, adding risky repayment dates can decrease pledgeable income. In some cases, pledgeability is maximized with one risky bullet repayment far in the future, effectively a long-term debt contract.

 

主讲人介绍:

Prof. Hongda Zhong is the Assistant Professor of London School of Economics (LSE).He earned his PhD in University of Minnesota.His research interests are Corporate Finance, Banking, Optimal Contract, Behavioral Finance, Mechanism Design.