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Group Identity and Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games

来源:湖南大学经济与管理研究中心  日期:2017-10-20 人气:

主题:Group Identity and Cooperation in Infinitely Repeated Games


讲人:刘潇 清华大学经济学院副教授


时间:1024日上午9点半


地点:二教203


 

内容:We design a laboratory experiment to study the impact of group identity on individual cooperation in infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. Group identity is randomly assigned and further enhanced in the laboratory. We find that group identity influences the participants’ actions.However, this impact operates through different channels and interacts with the probability of future interactions and the risk of cooperation. Group identity leads to higher, sustainable levels of cooperation with ingroup members when the probability of future interactions is high and the risk of cooperation is low. However, its impact on cooperation with ingroup members is less robust and shows a large degree of heterogeneity when the probability of future interactions is low and the risk of cooperation is high. We also find that participants are significantly less likely to adopt the always-defect strategy with ingroup members. The findings illuminate our understanding of the potential important impact of group identity on long-term cooperation, about which the previous literature on repeated games is largely silent.

 

 

主讲人介绍:

刘潇博士,目前任职为清华大学经济学院副教授,并兼任清华大学大数据技术中心的研究员,2012年获得美国密歇根大学的信息学博士学位,主要研究领域包括实验经济学、行为经济学、博弈论和信息经济学。曾在国际知名期刊如International Journal of Game TheoryExperimental EconomicsManagement ScienceGames and Economic Behavior等发表多篇学术文章,并主持教育部和腾讯的多个科研基金项目