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College Matching Mechanisms and Matching Stability: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in China

来源:湖南大学经济与管理研究中心 日期:2019-06-11 作者:

间:Jun.11th (Wednesday), 16:15-17:30PM


点:Room 211, Shuishang Teaching Building


题:College Matching Mechanisms and Matching Stability: Evidence from a Natural Experiment in China

主讲人:Yang Song


要:

Matching mechanisms play a crucial role in the college admissions process, which in turn influence education and labor market outcomes. We exploit geographical and temporal variations in the Chinese college admissions reform to provide new empirical evidence on how matching mechanisms affect matching stability. Consistent with theoretical findings by Chen and Kesten (2017), we show that switching from the Immediate Acceptance (IA) mechanism to the Chinese parallel mechanism, a hybrid of IA and the Deferred Acceptance mechanism, improved matching stability, proxied by the level of stratification precision. This effect is stronger for provinces with wider first parallel choice bands (in a nonlinear way) and intensifies over time. We find that the effect sizes in the large-scale, high-stakes setting are comparable with prior experimental findings, providing external validity support.


报告人简介:

Yang Song is an visiting assistant professor in Education Policy Initiative at Ford School of Public Policy, University of Michigan in 2018. She earned his Ph.D. in Economics, University of Pittsburgh 2015. Her research interests include Economics of Education, Chinese Economy, Behavioral Economics, Poverty and Inequality.