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Iterated Elimination Using Undominated Dominators

2019年10月22日  点击:[]

间:Oct.22th (Tuesday), 16:15-17:30PM

点:Room213, Shuishang Teaching Building

题:Iterated Elimination Using Undominated Dominators

主讲人:Xuewen Qian

 

摘要:

Based on the desideratum of undominated dominators, we provide a notion of iterated elimination of strictly boundedly dominated strategies (IESDSb) for strategic games. We investigate the existence and order-(in)dependence of IESDSb procedure. By introducing the property of heredity, we establish an equivalence result between IESDS and IESDSb. A motivating example is offered to illustrate the usefulness of IESDSb as a solution concept in implementation. We also examine the relationship between IESDSb and Nash equilibria.

 

报告人简介:

Xuewen Qian is an assistant professor from School of Economics, University of Nottingham Ningbo. He earned his Ph. D in Economics from National University of Singapore, 2016. His research interests include game theory, microeconomic theory. His recent paper “Iterated elimination procedures” is published on Econ Theory.

 

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