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Iterated Elimination Using Undominated Dominators

2019年10月22日  点击:[]

间:Oct.22th (Tuesday), 16:15-17:30PM

点:Room213, Shuishang Teaching Building

题:Iterated Elimination Using Undominated Dominators

主讲人:Xuewen Qian



Based on the desideratum of undominated dominators, we provide a notion of iterated elimination of strictly boundedly dominated strategies (IESDSb) for strategic games. We investigate the existence and order-(in)dependence of IESDSb procedure. By introducing the property of heredity, we establish an equivalence result between IESDS and IESDSb. A motivating example is offered to illustrate the usefulness of IESDSb as a solution concept in implementation. We also examine the relationship between IESDSb and Nash equilibria.



Xuewen Qian is an assistant professor from School of Economics, University of Nottingham Ningbo. He earned his Ph. D in Economics from National University of Singapore, 2016. His research interests include game theory, microeconomic theory. His recent paper “Iterated elimination procedures” is published on Econ Theory.



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